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1. Introduction
The police have always been ‘information workers’ (Stanier, 2016) and it 
comes as no surprise that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are increasingly mo-
bilising data for crime prevention. Historically, various systems and approaches 
have been developed such as the Police National Computer (Wilson, Ashton 
and Sharp, 2001, p. 73) in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1974. Recent develop-
ments related to digitalisation, the emergence of the Internet, mobile connectiv-
ity and advancements in computing power significantly increase the availability 
of information to LEAs (Bunnik et al., 2016). In other words, the opportunities 
for ‘data-driven-policing’ are immense in the digital age. These capabilities are 
fundamentally tied to the use of ‘Big Data’ which can be characterised by huge 
volume, high velocity, diversity in variety, exhaustiveness in scope, fine-grained 
resolution, relational nature and flexibility (Kitchin, 2014, pp. 1, 2).
Starting in 2008 a new method of policing emerged in the United States 
(US) that seeks to capitalise on these opportunities. First piloted by the Los An-
geles Police Department (LAPD) it soon became known as ‘Predictive Policing’ 
(PP). Originally, the idea of PP was to apply mathematical methods and insights 
from research on the occurrence of earthquakes to crime data in order to ‘fore-
cast crime’ (Ferguson, 2017, p. 1126). Such forecasting is typically focused on 
places where (1) property crime (e.g., bicycle theft, domestic burglary) or (2) 
violent crime takes place. While PP tools typically focus on the location of future 
crime, there are also variants which focus on forecasting which (3) persons might 
be involved in criminal activity (Ferguson, 2017). The use of data analysis and 
statistical methods to predict the likelihood of crime quickly became popular 
among LEAs in the US (Querbach, 2019). Unsurprisingly, LEAs across Europe 
are interested in the application of this method as well. Particularly, the National 
Police of the Netherlands (NPN) and police forces in Germany (e.g., Lower Sax-
ony, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria) recently ran pilots and tested the inclusion of 
PP tools in their operations. It seems that most LEAs use finished solutions of 
corporations (e.g., PredPol, IBM, Palantir) or develop tools in cooperation with 
research institutes. However, some police forces also develop their own PP tools 
(Querbach, 2019, p. 18).
Whilst there has been lots of optimism about the potential and efficiency of 
PP, questions have been raised regarding its social, ethical and legal implications 
(Ferguson 2017; March 2019; Puente, 2019; Puente, 2019a). Many of those 
mirror general considerations about the ethical application of Big Data and auto-
mated individual decision-making. For example, the impact of PP on privacy and 
the development opportunities of individuals and groups still needs to be better 
understood. Additionally, propensity towards pre-existing assumptions might 
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be incapsulated in obscure algorithms (Zwitter, 2014). In this context, some re-
searchers have claimed that there is a risk of public administration becoming a 
‘black box’ (Pasquale, 2015).
This report provides an overview on key challenges as well as an empirical 
investigation into the use of PP in the Netherlands and Lower Saxony in Germa-
ny. We outline persistent concerns relating to the social, ethical and legal domain 
and call for the systematic integration of detailed substantive guidelines and 
effective institutional oversight processes. These measures could become part 
of a toolkit supporting the successful and sustainable inclusion of PP for law en-
forcement practices. We conclude that scholars, policymakers and practitioners 
ought to have clear objectives determining what PP should achieve for the work 
of LEAs and the safety of individuals. Developing such an advanced understand-
ing is necessary to mitigate potential risks of the application of PP, enabling the 
evaluation of ongoing processes, and ultimately succeed through its use.
This submission is based on a general literature review plus the state-of-the-
art report produced by the Cutting Crime Impact Project (CCI).1 Consequently, 
it consists of a conceptual (section 3) and an empirical investigation (section 4). 
Subsequently, several salient points are identified in the ethical, legal and social 
domain with the intention to support the development of a holistic approach. 
Finally, conclusions and recommendations seek to improve the development 
of PP through the production of toolkits. As definition utilised here «[p]redictive 
policing is the collection and analysis of data about previous crimes for identifica-
tion and statistical prediction of individuals or geospatial areas with an increased 
probability of criminal activity to help developing policing intervention and pre-
vention strategies and tactics» (Meijer & Wessels, 2019, p. 3). Albeit with the an-
notation that some models have also included other types and sources of data 
– as the phrase ‘data about previous crimes’ suggests – these technologies rely 
exclusively on existing police data. However, the Dutch model specially includes 
a range of additional data sources, such as weather data or data provided by the 
national statistics office (Centraal Bureau Statistiek; Querbach, 2019).
2. Conceptual investigation
2.1. Why do ethics and human rights matter for Predictive Policing?
As outlined in the preamble of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) mem-
ber states are attached ‘to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for 
1  https://www.cuttingcrimeimpact.eu – accessed 1 August 2019.
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human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law.’ Article 2 TEU 
sentence 1 states that the ‘Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.’ In addition, Ar-
ticle 10 TEU paragraph 1 points out that the ‘functioning of the Union shall be 
founded on representative democracy.’ Synthesizing the essence of these legal 
provisions in one statement, public administration (including law enforcement) in 
the EU and its member states is bound by the rule of law, has the objective to 
promote human dignity as detailed further through individual fundamental rights 
and freedoms, and is controlled by the people which are organised in a system 
of representative democracy.
This is not only relevant for the EU in the areas it has the competence to 
govern. Since these fundamental provisions are also a declaration of will of the 
parties forming the union, they can be understood as a summary of the constitu-
tional traditions of European states where the EU does not have the competence 
to govern. The substantive essence of this finding is further solidified by interna-
tional agreements that member states of the EU and across ‘larger Europe’ have 
signed in the same spirit, such as the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) or the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108) of the Council of Europe 
(Gstrein, 2019, pp. 79-84).
While digitalisation and related technological developments create new 
opportunities for LEAs in preventative action through the mobilisation of vast 
amounts of data from a wide range of sources, the 2013 Edward Snowden 
revelations on global surveillance have highlighted the need for more public and 
political debate on the use of data in the context of law enforcement (Cannataci, 
2017, pp. 17-21). As the United Nations have recognised in several resolutions 
on the right to privacy in the digital age, human rights apply online as much as 
they do offline (United Nations, 2018). However, what this means in practice 
remains rather unclear due to the abstract and general wording of human rights 
principles on the global and European level. In other words, while it is agreed that 
human rights are applicable to the digitalisation of law enforcement, it is unclear 
how they should be interpreted in detail. This is one of the main reasons why 
there is space for ethical deliberations to further inform the debate and actions 
of decision-makers. Particularly, when considering the application of innovative 
methods such as PP, which is based on novel technologies such as Big Data 
and automated decision-making, the need for a general and profound debate 
including ethical considerations is large.
Another important element relates to the understanding of public security 
and the task of LEAs in Europe. The objective of CCI is to develop toolkits for 
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LEAs which facilitate the fight against crime and ultimately assist in creating a 
safer society. Nevertheless, from an ethical, legal and social perspective and in 
light of what has been stated at the beginning of this section, this means that 
such understanding of security entails human dignity and individual freedom. 
Put differently, in principle a European concept of security is also an enabler 
of freedom, personal expression and privacy. This aspect might sometimes be 
overlooked and underemphasised in the day-to-day work of LEAs. It also differs 
from the understanding of security in other regions of the world. In countries 
such as the People’s Republic of China the ‘rule of trust’ seems to replace the 
‘rule of law’ with the digitalisation of law enforcement, manifested through the 
omnipresent installation of facial recognition, artificial intelligence (AI) and PP 
(Chen, Lin, Liu, 2018).
Furthermore, the use of data by law enforcement as well as the application of 
proprietary tools of third-parties frequently evokes cross-border scenarios where 
national regulation and territory-bound approaches face limitations. Hence, the 
importance of international frameworks including European and international hu-
man rights law is also stressed from this perspective. While actors such as the 
EU (proposal for an e-evidence package) or the US (Clarifying Lawful Overseas 
Use of Data Act; CLOUD) aim at addressing these gaps for investigatory pur-
poses, most other LEA activities such as PP remain practically untouched (Cole, 
Quintel, 2018). In the absence of specified and detailed regulatory frameworks 
addressing this reality, human rights and ethics with their universal and non-ter-
ritory-bound quality are put at the centre of the discourse.
Hence, it is not surprising that LEAs face increasing scrutiny about their 
practices in the digital domain (Bunnik, n.d.). Necessarily, PP has received signif-
icant attention from academics, media, activists and politicians in recent years. 
For the general public, the applicable norms governing the use of this new meth-
od seem to be a mixture of what corporations or data analysts embed in the 
code of the software on the one hand (‘Code is Law’; Lessig, 2006), and admin-
istrative practice and expertise of LEAs on the other. Such an approach cannot 
satisfy the complex societal requirements and fails to build the necessary trust 
of a free society in the work of LEAs. Questions have been raised if PP results in 
the unfair targeting of minorities and ethnic or religious groups, amongst others 
(Ferguson 2017). Furthermore, PP invokes images of ‘the Big Brother state’ and 
Hollywood movies such as Minority Report from 2002 in which human behaviour 
is constantly monitored to prevent crime before it occurs (Bunnik, 2016; Rich-
ards, 2016).
In that sense, police intelligence moves further into the traditional domain of 
intelligence agencies and secret services. The wealth of data available to police 
the public sphere, thus, leads to a new power structure. However, differently as 
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one might expect, this shift not only favours the executive but also the private 
corporations that possess much of the used data (e.g., social media data) and 
produce the tools of analysis (Zwitter, 2015).
Perhaps most of all, PP is about bigger societal questions around power, 
governance and the relationship between the state and citizens. In the absence 
of detailed legal frameworks addressing these open questions, invoking ethics 
and human rights helps understand the (potentially) shifting power-relations be-
tween government, individuals and the communities that it seeks to protect. 
2.2. Predictive Policing and the larger discussion on automated de-
cision-making (AI, ML) in public administration
Ethical issues concerning PP are grounded in the wider context of digitali-
sation and related discussions on automated decision-making, surveillance and 
the impact of the use of such technologies on the developmental opportunities 
of individuals and groups. This particularly affects the right to information (trans-
parency), freedom of expression and privacy (Cannataci, 2017a). PP does not 
emerge from a vacuum. Rather, it can be understood as a subsection of a global 
development where states and corporations mobilise Big Data to predict future 
human behaviour through systems based on AI and ML (Bunnik et al., 2016; 
Gstrein, 2016; Veale, Brass, 2019). For companies like Amazon, Facebook or 
Google this concerns what user X or Y is likely to purchase or interested in 
(Zuboff, 2019). LEAs, meanwhile, are keen to predict where crime is most likely 
to occur (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013). Whenever the automation of pub-
lic administration occurs the main incentives are to increase the (1) quantity or (2) 
efficiency of one or a set of activities of a public service. This raises questions on 
the necessary and appropriate decisions on the macro (government strategy), 
meso (from policy objectives to practice) and micro level (implementing rights of 
a data subject, appropriate use of the system; Veale, Brass, 2019).
Despite those largely open questions, the mass-adoption of such autono-
mous systems seems to occur with breath-taking speed and affects all sectors 
of public administration. An EU focused 2019 report of the German civil society 
organisation ‘Algorithm Watch’ and Bertelsmann Stiftung finds that autonomous 
systems in public administration are particularly in use in the security sector (e.g., 
border control, PP), workforce management (e.g., job applications, management 
of the unemployed) or to monitor social service schemes (e.g., fraud prevention; 
Spielkamp, 2019, pp. 17-144). However, the popularity of such systems with 
policy- and decision-makers is in stark contrast to the awareness of the general 
population on the use of them, or the perception of usefulness of the underlying 
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technologies. A representative survey carried out by Bertelsmann Stiftung at ap-
proximately the same time (‘What Europe knows and thinks about algorithms’) 
highlights that only 48 percent of Europeans claim to know what an algorithm 
is. Only 46 percent see more advantages of the use of algorithms, while 20 per-
cent expect predominantly problems. A full 74 percent of the total participants 
demand more rigorous controls and regulation on their use. Additionally, the 
survey also highlights that national perceptions differ. For example, respondents 
in Poland seem rather optimistic on the use of algorithms, while participants in 
France were scared to a significant degree (Grzymek, Puntschuh, 2019).
An example from the US shows what can go wrong if autonomous sys-
tems are deployed in a rushed manner and without consideration of the broader 
ethical, legal, and social issues. On 23 May 2016 the non-profit organisation 
ProPublica published an article in which it was claimed that an analytical tool 
in use by judges in several US states was based on an algorithm that had an 
inherent bias against black people (Angwin et al., 2016). Through data analysis 
the tool called COMPAS offered judges a score which should help them predict 
the likelihood of recidivism of inmates. Although contested by the developer of 
the proprietary tool, empirical investigation of ProPublica found that the system 
produced worse outcomes for people with non-white genetic backgrounds. Ac-
cording to the investigation «[…] [t]he formula was particularly likely to falsely flag 
black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labelling them this way at almost 
twice the rate as white defendants. White defendants were mislabelled as low 
risk more often than black defendants. […] (Angwin et al., 2016).» Although the 
findings of COMPAS are only considered to be recommendations for the judge, 
their existence and potential harm have caused considerable public discussion 
and scepticism (Israni, 2017). As more research is carried out on the appro-
priate implementation of forecasting systems in the criminal justice sector, it 
becomes clear that they need not only to work reliably according to existing fun-
damental legal norms and values which enable them to meet the benchmarks 
of current practices. While they will never be perfect, they will only succeed if 
they can become part of decision-making processes that qualitatively exceed 
an ‘entirely human’ system (Berk, 2019). Yet, even if this complex task will be 
accomplished, the larger question of how to gain societal trust is only partially 
addressed.
Finally, in a court of law all evidence presented needs to be accessible and 
verifiable by the judge and the accused. Providing results of a black box that de-
termines over guilt, innocence, likelihood of recidivism etc., without the ability of 
recourse, undermines fundamental legal principles such as the equality of arms 
and the access to evidence by all three instances, the judge, the public pros-
ecutor and the accused. This reduces the justice system to an inquisition-like 
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process in which only the algorithm and possibly the IT expert will be able to 
understand the processes of decision making (Martini, 2019, pp. 27-112).
2.3. Useful concepts and theories
When considering technologies with the potential to have a wide and deep 
impact in society, ‘value-sensitive design’ (VSD) and ‘moral overload’ are both 
useful concepts to mitigate risks. VSD enables engineers, developers and oth-
ers that engage in creating technical solutions to integrate ethics in the design 
process. It centres around engaging with questions such as: how are direct and 
indirect stakeholders affected by the technology? What human values are under 
stress? (Friedman, Kahn & Borning, 2008) VSD starts from the observation that 
technology is a force that (partially) constitutes the social context to which it is 
applied, including conventions, policies, regulations and institutions – but this 
social context in turn also impacts on the use and design of technology. Nei-
ther human experience nor technology take centre stage. Instead the interac-
tion should be understood as an ongoing process during which the component 
values can be reviewed (Friedman, Kahn & Borning, 2008). As such, it does not 
focus solely on the design stage of new technologies, but also on its implemen-
tation and user experience in an organisational setting.
Closely linked to VSD is the concept of moral overload. Technologies are 
designed to make the world a better place, such as by increasing safety and 
security, while at the same time respecting fundamental human rights such as 
privacy, promoting a liberal society, as well as supporting human autonomy and 
dignity. Additionally, they need to be designed in a way that enables transparency 
and accountability. However, technologies that advance one value can come at 
the expense of others – privacy versus security is often invoked on law enforce-
ment innovation through Big Data. This moral overload frequently causes a value 
trade-off where – in hindsight – hard decisions have to be made regarding what 
is more important (van den Hoven et al., 2012). Making the value component of 
new technologies, and its impact on society, more explicit in the design phase 
enables a frontloading of ethics (van den Hoven, 2007). By integrating ethics and 
human rights already in the design process, CCI strives to avoid the trade-off 
scenario and rather employs a holistic approach with a security concept that in-
tegrates freedom and privacy. This report contributes to this cause by informing 
some of the key stakeholders on persistent social, ethical and legal issues in the 
early stages of the design process. The following section explores these issues 
in more detail and explains why they should be approached in a holistic fashion.
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3. Empirical investigation
3.1. The Netherlands
The Dutch Crime Anticipation System (CAS) developed in 2013 is imple-
mented nationally. It is interesting for various reasons. First, it was developed 
in-house unlike most of the systems that are purchased in the Anglo-Saxon 
market where companies such as IBM and PredPol are important players. Sec-
ondly, compared to the German case, it relies on a wider variety of data sourc-
es. The Dutch clearly have less hesitation to aggregate data which could be 
explained by cultural factors, such as German recent history with the German 
Democratic Republic or the Third Reich in which surveillance was a dominant 
feature of the state. Additionally, a lot of data sources in the Netherlands are 
already aggregated to a high degree at institutions such as the central statistics 
office (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; CBS). Hence, they are relatively easily 
accessible whereas in Germany institutions at different federal levels have dif-
ferent competences for the collection and use of data. Thirdly, the Dutch model 
does not solely predict future locations of crime but also delivers predictions 
on humans: «In some cases, the tools also seek to identify individuals at risk of 
victimisation. Referred to as ‘risk taxation instruments’, such instruments try to 
predict the probability of an individual (including young offenders) committing 
a crime or terrorist attack» (Querbach, 2019, p. 17). This is not only a lot more 
innovative than predicting hotpots, it is also an ethical minefield (Marsh, 2019). 
As terrorism luckily is a low-probability event, the chance of both false positives 
and false negatives becomes a major concern (Bunnik, 2016). A related problem 
could occur when these approaches start predicting possible victims of crime: 
should LEAs or partner agencies confront those persons with such devastating 
news, even if there is a chance of false positives?
Finally, the Dutch system is developed to support a multi-agency approach. 
This particular development is in line with previous findings in the UK. Interviews 
with senior law enforcement officers revealed that many are hopeful that digi-
talisation and Big Data will lead to better sharing of information and intelligence 
between agencies and public bodies, leading to a wider public sector approach 
to law enforcement (Bunnik, n.d.). This development taking place in both the 
UK and Netherlands raises ethical and legal questions on the sharing of data 
between agencies (Crockett et al., 2013). Who gets access to what and for 
which purposes? It also raises a more existential question on the future of law 
enforcement, when public bodies and partners are increasingly collaborating as 
part of a shared, coherent governance approach. 
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3.2. Germany – Lower Saxony
Since 2014 six LEAs in Germany started to develop and use externally and 
internally developed PP tools. These efforts produced mixed results, including 
promising perspectives for some tools (Querbach, 2019, pp. 12, 13). Among the 
LEAs working with PP, the case of Lower Saxony is particularly interesting since 
it developed PP first in cooperation with IBM and the Karlsruhe Institute for Tech-
nology. However, due to concerns over the sharing of crime data with private 
corporations and the risk that LEAs would not be capable to explain decisions 
based on suggestions of an externally developed system, the ‘PreMap’ project 
started in 2016. The development of the tool was facilitated by the fact that the 
necessary expertise to develop PP was available within the LEA.
As all German PP tools, PreMap addresses domestic burglary, which was a 
particular concern in the last years. The basis for the prediction is historic crime 
data ranging from 2008 to 2013. PreMAP calculates a score that remains valid 
for 72 hours and includes the area within a radius of 400 m around an observed 
burglary. The tool can be accessed via an application for mobile phones which 
allows to access forecasts made using the ‘near-repeat’ theory (Querbach, 
2019, p. 14). This approach is based on research showing that the ‘repeat vic-
timisation theory’ is a useful basis to address crime such as burglary, domestic 
violence, and vehicle theft (Querbach, 2019, pp. 10, 11). The main organisation-
al response to the predictions is the reconsideration of where LEA forces should 
be active to prevent or fight crime. Besides predictions on where burglary might 
take place, PreMap also offers a ‘Crime Radar’. This radar displays all offences 
in public spaces in the last four weeks with the possibility for agents to access 
additional information on demand. An evaluation of the tool came to the con-
clusion that it does not violate civil rights. The LEA sees lots of positive potential 
to inform the work of agents. However, PreMap is primarily considered as one 
additional tool to facilitate crime prevention and there was more need to improve 
the accuracy of the predictions as well as the interpretation of results by officers 
(Querbach, 2019, p. 15).
4. Holistic approach: ethical, legal and social concerns
4.1. Ethical 
PP evokes a wide range of ethical concerns. This section addresses several 
of these, such as the questions of data selection and machine bias, visualis-
ation and interpretation of forecasts, transparency and accountability, time and 
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effectiveness as well as the problem of stigmatisation of individuals, environ-
ments and community areas. This list is not conclusive. It provides an overview 
of some salient aspects that should be addressed when designing PP toolkits. 
Data selection and machine bias
PP is a tool to forecast the likelihood of crime based on statistical methods 
and gradually evolving interpretation mechanisms. Hence, the selection of data 
which is the basis of the forecast is essential. If there is not enough data, irrel-
evant data, inaccurate data, outdated data or data which is otherwise of poor 
quality the final predictions will likely reflect this. Furthermore, historic crime data 
plays an important role in the ‘training’ of many PP tools, which raises the ques-
tion whether the resulting automated decisions only fortify potentially inherent 
bias and discrimination. The question how empirical facts in the form of historic 
data, which might include decisions based on overcome world views, affect the 
findings of PP systems still requires more research. A recent review of police 
practices in various US cities which used PP in different scenarios over a con-
siderable amount of time revealed how ‘dirty data’ can lead to bad predictions 
with serious societal implications (Richardson, Schultz & Crawford, 2019). Such 
findings, which share many aspects of the COMPAS case described above, cre-
ate serious tensions and a profound lack of trust (Jones, 2019). Senior officers in 
the UK are also worried about poor data quality in its forces (Bunnik, n.d.).
Hence, a sound data management culture is essential and gains increasing 
attention (Puente, 2019). While detailed legislative frameworks might help in es-
tablishing it, as we will expand below, the term culture is of utmost importance in 
this regard. As initial work in CCI with police forces from across Europe suggests 
that the selection and use of data are often also related to what is considered 
as a priority in policing itself. This mostly affects the choices made in relation to 
crimes addressed with PP as well as the choice of historic data relating to crime. 
While such data is typically at the heart of the PP prediction models, another 
question is which additional sources (e.g., statistical data on the population, data 
of police forces in other parts of a country, open data such as traffic maps or 
weather conditions) are used to augment predictions. In this respect, even the 
basic constitution of a state (e.g., more centralised like in the Netherlands, more 
federal like in Germany) might play an implicit role, since it is either relatively easy 
or very cumbersome to get access to those additional sources. 
Visualisation and interpretation of forecasts
Once a prediction has been made it needs to be visualised. PP can be un-
derstood as a data-driven method to ‘look at’ the probability of crime. As Mar-
shall McLuhan stated in his ground-breaking work on media theory, the process 
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of presenting content deserves particular attention since ‘the medium is the 
message’ (McLuhan, 1962). Many PP applications such as the Criminele Anti-
patie System (CAS) in the Netherlands create a ‘heatmap’ as result of the data 
analysis. In other words, a certain territory is mapped and divided in quarters of 
a particular size (e.g., 125 x 125 metres; Mali et al., 2017, p. 31). Where crime 
is more likely to occur, individual quarters are highlighted. Already during the de-
sign process decisions need to be made regarding under which circumstances 
certain quarters will be marked. If too many areas demand attention, if they are 
marked too quickly, or if they are marked on the wrong basis (e.g., bad quality 
data), the tool will rather confuse than support LEAs. 
However, ‘grid mapping’ is not the only possibility to visualise data. Other 
approaches focus on the precise location of crime and not so much on the cov-
ered territory. Areas where crimes are most likely are covered by ellipses which 
can have various shapes. Another method focuses on crime density estimations 
(‘Kernel Density Estimation’). Here, an area with peaks and valleys is displayed, 
the highest points indicating where crime is most likely to occur (Perry et al., 
2013). All of these choices fundamentally influence how LEAs use PP and un-
derstand the results of a forecast. Furthermore, the visualisation problem also 
has a more fundamental dimension. The design of dashboards and visualisation 
tools is both a scientific as well as an artistic process. The manner in which data 
is represented directly impacts on the actions that will be undertaken. If for ex-
ample colour coding is used, colour codes will determine the urgency that will be 
attributed by the law enforcement officer. Since the dashboard designer usually 
knows little about the decision-making parameters of law enforcement officers, 
it is paramount that both work together in the design phase in order to ensure 
that information is presented in a consistent and actionable way.
Transparency and accountability
One of the key issues concerns transparency and accountability. There is a 
danger that the predictions become the results of a process hidden in a ‘black 
box’. As a result, they are difficult to understand for citizens, but perhaps even 
for police officers, policy-makers and politicians (Spielkamp, 2019). Can LEAs 
still explain why they send agents to monitor a specific location or target a po-
tential victim or offender? This aspect is closely related to the accountability of 
police officers and is tied to the larger discussion of the ability to explain actions 
based on suggestions that AI/ML-driven systems produce (Wachter, Mittelstadt, 
Floridi, 2017). It is crucial that PP is understood as a data-driven tool with a 
limited role in fighting actual crime. In other words, PP is a means to an end and 
not an end in itself. Furthermore, transparency and accountability are not just an 
issue vis-à-vis the public but also internally within LEAs. What is the relationship 
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between the developers of algorithms, the managers of databases and police 
officers on the streets and in neighbourhoods? Who is accountable to whom 
in such a complex system of data, technology and human agency (Meijer & 
Wessels, 2019, p. 7)? Finally, if LEAs use PP tools that they buy from corpora-
tions, will any data or insights remain with the state or will such private parties 
gain the ability to create superior insights on safety and security by pooling the 
data from different LEAs?
Time and effectiveness
Ultimately, data-driven PP promises a lean and effective police force – a 
promise that in times of austerity hardly any police agency can resist. The po-
tential disconnect between data which underlies a certain intervention and the 
action that has been a result thereof jeopardizes the success of PP. In current 
systems, the kind of response that is recommended is usually not specified. 
The effectiveness of the intervention is thus only implicitly featured in the newly 
collected data after it took place. This can lead to skewed assessments during 
evaluation and the unjustified preference of certain interventions over others.
Furthermore, not only LEAs will adapt their behaviour once PP is used. Po-
tential criminals will react to the new method as well and adjust their behaviour. 
Remarkably, 2008 was not only the year in which the first PP systems were 
tested, but also the one in which the criminal organization Lashkar-e-Taiba used 
data analytics in orchestrating the Mumbai terror attacks (Zwitter, 2015, p. 377). 
This shows that criminals are also using data analytics to improve their opera-
tions. In police circles the discourse around reverse engineering of PP or coun-
ter-PP for criminal means is increasing. 
Since PP is still a relatively new phenomenon it is hard to predict in which 
areas and to which magnitude such effects will materialize in practice. Obvious 
adoptions of behaviour include differently chosen targets, modified attacks on 
different locations at different times, and sensing new patterns in the behaviour 
of LEAs over time (e.g., when there is a rain forecast on Friday night for a certain 
part of a city, more officers will be patrolling). 
Currently, it seems practically impossible to prove the effectiveness of the 
use of PP (Meijer & Wessels, 2019, pp. 7-8). If the only success factor is a re-
duced crime rate, the available evidence-based research cannot underpin the 
desirability of its use. While a pilot in the Netherlands claims that the predictions 
are ‘good enough’ (the Dutch CAS was apparently able to predict around 30 
percent of burglaries in Amsterdam during a pilot which was published in 2017), 
another study of a system in Germany (Baden-Württemberg) concludes that 
there is a moderate effect at best (Mali et al., 2017, p. 31; Gerstner, 2018). Crime 
as a phenomenon still seems too complex and multi-faceted to be tackled and 
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prevented through the use and analysis of data only. Potentially, the biggest ad-
vantage of the use of PP is not the simple reduction of crime rates. Rather, it can 
be a useful and innovative tool in a larger toolbox LEAs use to better understand 
their own work and improve their own management practices internally, which 
might allow them to ultimately improve safety and security (Querbach, 2019, 
p. 21).
Stigmatisation of individuals, environments and community areas
Individual stigmatisation can occur when, for example, for the purpose of 
assessment of individual likelihood of recidivism (see COMPAS), individuals are 
assessed and subsequently subjected to different targeted approaches by law 
enforcement agencies, than they would have been without that knowledge. Fur-
thermore, stigmatisation of individuals in risk communities can also occur when 
data analytics suggest police interventions in certain neighbourhoods. Particu-
larly, the popular grid-mapping visualisation which emphasises the connection 
between crime and territory raises the concern if the use of PP results in stig-
matisation of community areas. While LEAs and the general population might 
already be associating certain areas of a community with more crime, the use 
of data could reinforce such prejudice. This ‘evidence-based stigma’ negative-
ly impacts the development perspectives of individuals and communities living 
in such areas. Additionally, practically no legal remedies and safeguards are in 
place to mitigate this risk (Gstrein & Ritsema van Eck, 2018). Hence, it is not only 
necessary to consider which data and process is used to create the forecasts, 
but also how the forecasts are stored, for which period they can be retrieved, 
with whom they are shared, and when they are ultimately erased/destroyed.
4.2. Legal
Many of the ethical issues outlined above can be mapped out in parallel in the 
legal landscape. More specifically, the introduction of PP raises concerns relating 
to the development of individuals and groups. These concerns of increased gov-
ernment-led monitoring and surveillance can be tied to the debate about privacy 
in the digital age. However, just as PP, privacy should not be considered as an 
end in itself. Rather and as already indicated earlier, it is an enabling right that is 
closely connected to other rights such as freedom of expression, or the right to 
information (Cannataci, 2017a).
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFEU) offers a unique way 
to protect this right (Hoofnagle, van der Sloot & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2019 
pp. 69-72). It is not only covered in Article 7 (Respect for private and family 
life), but also with a second provision covering ‘the protection of personal data’ 
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in Article 8 (González Fuster, 2014, pp. 202-5). The apparent coexistence and 
necessity of both of these rights raises the question how they differ. Other inter-
national legal instruments such as the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) with its rich and developing jurisprudence on privacy do not con-
tain a specific provision relating to digital personal data (Kochenov, Gstrein & Ve-
raldi, 2018, pp. 24-9). Also, the United Nations Framework just relates to privacy 
in Article 12 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 17 of 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It might be argued that particularly an application based on Big Data and ML 
such as PP proves the necessity of the added provision focusing on personal 
data in the CFEU. Privacy is typically seen as an individual right, focusing on the 
implications of arbitrary, unnecessary and disproportionate state behaviour to 
limit the integrity of physical personal space and deliberation. However, more 
recently the discussion of legal scholars has shifted towards considering the pro-
tection for groups in the context of privacy and autonomy. If individuals are tied 
together in groups and willingly or unwillingly made subject to data analysis and 
data-driven decisions, they are largely left without effective legal safeguards and 
remedies (Taylor, van der Sloot & Floridi, 2017). PP might affect them negatively 
as part of groups while at the same time only allowing them to react based on 
individual rights with too narrow a scope.
This gets more concrete when considering EU GDPR and the corresponding 
EU directive 2016/680 for automated data processing in the LEA context. Both 
legal frameworks contain (in Article 17 GDPR and Article 11 of the directive) a 
right to human review of automated individual decisions as well as an obligation 
for states to adopt ‘appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of a 
data subject’. However, this provision does not address how an individual, that 
is considered as part of a group and only subject to data processing ‘in bunch’, 
could invoke the rights enshrined in this provision. Hence, it might be appropri-
ate to develop a right for groups to check automated individual decisions and 
corresponding practices of LEAs. When specifically considering PP, commu-
nities subject to increased police scrutiny could have a right to review the PP 
tool and data-driven LEA practices. In the absence of such a provision, the only 
provision in place for individuals to protect them against negative consequences 
of PP remains the abstract Article 8 of the CFEU, which limits the collection of 
raw personal data that in turn become the basis for the use of PP.
A 2017 report on ‘Big Data and security policies’ published in the Netherlands 
– which could also inform the development of PP – summarizes the substantive 
legal and procedural challenges in three main points. First, the establishment of 
a duty of care when it comes to the selection of data is recommended. Secondly, 
more regulation covering the creation of profiles seems advisable. Thirdly, the 
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possibility for judicial review is crucial to stimulate the development of case law 
in this area (Broeders, Schijvers & Hirsch Ballin, 2017).
Ultimately, the mere fact that police action can be based on predictions of 
crime prevalence, specifically when it concerns analytics regarding potential 
crimes of individuals can shift the focus from short-term pre-emption to preven-
tion. Legally speaking, such an approach might effectively transform the legal 
concept of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ into ‘(predicted) guilty until proven inno-
cent’. At the same time, the existence of such a crime prediction forces LEAs to 
respond with at least surveillance and at worst interception, de facto hollowing 
out the assumption of innocence. Furthermore, after the occurrence of a major 
crime, in light of the new PP methods journalistic and political inspections tend 
to focus on whether the LEAs possessed the data to forecast the crime. This 
can have concrete consequences on whether and how LEAs adopt PP in their 
routines. 
4.3. Social
Both the ethical and legal domain intersect with social challenges. Hence, 
this perspective is used in this report as an additional lens to highlight issues of 
PP with particular focus on the practical impact. As PP is introduced real-world 
implications for citizens materialize. First, PP raises questions on trust in govern-
ment, the social contract between state and citizens, democracy and the rule 
of law. The previously mentioned case study on the use of PP in cities in the US 
including Chicago and New Orleans emphasises that bad data quality can lead 
to the unfair targeting of specific groups and communities (Richardson, Schultz 
& Crawford, 2019). If there is more and predominantly negative data on certain 
communities which are already stigmatised as being problematic, PP might re-
peatedly inspect target areas where those communities predominantly live. It will 
be difficult to escape from such a ‘feedback loop’. In this context, it could also be 
problematic that PP uses ML as underlying technology. At this moment in time it 
remains unclear whether and how ML can integrate societal goals in the gradual 
development of an algorithm that produces individual automated-decisions. 
Secondly, and related to the first point on trust, it is necessary to emphasize 
and scrutinize the culture around the collection, analysis, interpretation, sharing, 
storage and erasure of data which is crucial to use PP for good. For example, 
how could a cycle of interest for LEAs look like? For how long is historical crime 
data relevant and under which circumstances can it be left out for future predic-
tions? Addressing this point might be an advantage for the EU as it traditionally 
has relatively developed ethical and legal frameworks in this area.
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The third point relates to the possibility of transparency when using PP. LEAs 
will require confidentiality to be able to fight crime on the one hand, while wanting 
to keep a good relationship with citizens and communities on the other. To find 
the right means and venues of engagement is crucial in order to use the arrival 
of this new technology as an opportunity. If applied correctly, PP can also sup-
port the decisions of LEAs and make their actions more legitimate in the eyes 
of the public since they are data-driven and informed by empirical methods. It 
is certainly true that PP systems can become ‘black boxes’, but human deci-
sion-making processes can also be opaque and non-transparent.
In conclusion, if ethical and legal issues are not addressed in the design 
of these systems and technologies their implementation can and will lead to 
considerable societal disruptions. If certain groups or communities are unfairly 
targeted, or perceive as such, the danger exists of diminishing trust in policing, 
and perhaps even the state in general. This is somewhat similar to discussions 
on CCTV or stop and search, whereby discrimination is an ongoing issue of 
concern (Jones, 2019). Currently, it seems that several actors have recognised 
these dangers. As the decisions to ban the use of facial recognition in the law 
enforcement context in San Francisco (California), Somerville (Massachusetts), 
and Oakland (California) show, the speed of digitisation in law enforcement has 
intentionally slowed down and the culture around the use of data could be about 
to improve (Conger, Fausset & Kovaleski, 2019; Lecher, 2019).
5. Conclusion
While the spur to adopt a ‘technology driven crime reduction spirit’ is useful, 
the emergence and increasing importance of data-enabled interfaces to forecast 
and prevent crime comes with the risk that the means are being transformed into 
an end. However, by engaging with the many complex questions that digitalisa-
tion brings to policing, an opportunity also emerges to re-evaluate policing tasks 
and processes. We suggest that this is currently the biggest advantage of the 
use of PP. If the culture around the collection and use of data is solid and the de-
cision-making processes as well as their interpretation are understood by LEAs, 
PP can become a tool to create a better internal understanding of processes 
as well as more public legitimacy and trust. If the focus on the benefits for the 
human individual and the good for society is maintained, PP has the potential to 
improve the work of LEAs.
PP is becoming an established practice in Europe and particularly in the 
Netherlands and Germany. Furthermore, the empirical review elucidated that 
PP is not a one-size-fits-all approach with differences between those countries, 
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particularly when it comes to the selection and combination of data sources. The 
German context provides for more hesitation to mobilise data for preventative 
governance practices than the Dutch. At the same time, the comparison invites 
speculation whether the digitisation of the work of LEAs will not only highlight 
differences in the traditional understanding of their work, but also foster a more 
unified understanding of their future tasks and methods.
Based on the literature and empirical review we have come to the conclusion 
that it is necessary to address several connected ethical, legal and social issues. 
These are centred around the topics of data selection and machine bias, vis-
ualisation and interpretation of forecasts, transparency and accountability, time 
and effectiveness as well as the problem of stigmatisation of individuals, environ-
ments and community areas. We hope that this review will inform the production 
of toolkits that will help LEAs to mitigate risks and improve their work. Further-
more, the focus on these issues will support decision-makers to create clear and 
meaningful success criteria for the deployment and use of PP. The formulation 
of such objectives is duly needed in order to develop PP further, ensuring that it 
will become an innovative and effective tool in the growing toolbox of LEAs that 
allows them to ensure safety and security in the digital age.
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